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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JULIA LEE ASKEW, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
vs. 
PAUL HARDMAN, 
Defendant and Appellee, 
> Appeals No. 930537-CA 
i Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by applying the 
multi-factored test mandated by the Utah Supreme Court in Gold 
Standard v. American Barrack Resources, Inc., 805 P.2d 164 (Utah 
1990), in ruling that the insurer's claim file was prepared in 
anticipation of litigation? If so, has Askew demonstrated that the 
likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to 
undermine confidence in the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 
817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding 
Robert Harmon as a witness where the probative value of the 
testimony was outweighed by the danger that insurance would be 
injected into the litigation, thereby prejudicing Hardman, and 
where the testimony would be cumulative? If so, has Askew 
demonstrated that the likelihood of a different outcome is 
sufficiently high as to undermine confidence in the verdict. 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch,, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to 
risk the injection of insurance and possibly a mistrial on the last 
day of trial by precluding Askew from introducing testimony that 
neither she nor her representatives took the photographs of the 
fence? If so, has Askew demonstrated that the likelihood of a 
different outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine confidence 
in the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 
1991). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), attached as Exhibit "N". 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-38(3)(1988), attached as Exhibit "N". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case was tried to a jury. The Order of Judgment entered 
after trial provided: 
Interrogatory Number 1 of the special verdict asked the 
question, "Was the Defendant, Paul Hardman, negligent", 
to which the jury answered "No." The special verdict was 
signed and dated by the jury foreperson, Richard K. 
Johnson, January 15, 1993. The jury was polled and it was 
determined that their verdict was unanimous. 
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R. 1711-1712. The jury apparently concluded that the accident was 
caused by: (1) the criminal acts of unidentified trespassers 
combined with (2) the negligence of Kevin Butts in exceeding the 
speed limit, driving too fast for existing conditions, failing to 
heed the traffic signs, failing to keep a proper lookout, and 
failing to exercise due care under the circumstances. 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
1. This case arose when an automobile in which Askew was 
riding as a passenger collided with a horse owned by Hardman on 
State Road 68 near Camp Williams, Utah County, State of Utah. The 
accident occurred on November 20, 1989, at approximately 7:20 p.m. 
2. The horse that was involved in the collision was being 
kept in Hardman's winter pasture with approximately 13 to 14 other 
horses owned by Hardman. (Hardman Transcript, p. 61, Exhibit "G") 
Hardman1s winter pasture is located over one mile to the northeast 
of his home across State Road 68. (Id. at pp. 6-9, 38; 
See Defendant's Exhibit #6, Exhibit "P" (Hardman's home is outlined 
in red marker just to the west of S.R. 68. The winter pasture is 
outlined in red to the northeast of Hardman*s home.)) The winter 
pasture is separated from State Road 68 by Camp Williams, a 
military camp operated by the Utah National Guard, and a 30 acre 
hayfield. (Hardman Depo., pp. 17-18, 104-05, Exhibit "E"; Exhibit 
"P") . The winter pasture is approximately 80 acres in size. 
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size. (Hardman Depo. , p. 47, Exhibit "E"). The feed in the winter 
pasture was plentiful in late November of 1989 when this accident 
occurred. (Hardman Transcript, pp. 119-122, Exhibit "G"). 
3. Hardman moves his horses to the winter pasture every fall 
and keeps them fenced in the winter pasture until about February of 
the following year. (Hardman Depo., p. 16, Exhibit "E"). The 
fences of the winter pasture are inspected and mended before the 
horses are put in the pasture each fall. (Hardman Transcript, p. 
96, Exhibit "G"). 
4. In the fall of 1989, Hardman moved his horses into the 
winter pasture about three weeks before the accident of this case. 
(Id. at 65; Hardman Depo., p. 39, Exhibit "E"). Before moving his 
horses into the pasture, Hardman hired two men, Doug Smith and 
Darrell Allred, to reconstruct and/or repair the barbed wire fence 
and posts which surrounded the pasture. (Hardman Transcript, p. 
24, Exhibit "G"; Smith Transcript, pp. 4-5 and 14, Exhibit "J"). 
This work was performed approximately one to two weeks before the 
horses were moved into the pasture. (Hardman Depo., pp. 39 an 182, 
Exhibit "E"). Smith spent two full days repairing the fence to the 
winter pasture. (Smith Transcript, p. 5, Exhibit "J"). When the 
work was finished, the fence surrounding the winter pasture was in 
good repair and adequate to fence Hardman's horses. (Hardman 
Transcript, pp. 53 and 124, Exhibit "G"; Smith Transcript p. 6, 
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Exhibit "J"). When Smith and Allred completed the fencing work, 
the height of the top wire on the north side of the pasture was 
from 3 1/2 to 4 feet and the lower wire was from 18 inches to 2 
feet in height. (Smith Transcript, p. 8, Exhibit "J"). 
5. The fence along the north side of the pasture in the area 
where the horses escaped was a two strand barbed wire fence. 
(Hardman Transcript, pp. 14, 26, 28, Exhibit "G") . Hardman used 
more than two strands, three to five strands, of barbed wire in 
sections of the fence where there were canals, hills or the contour 
of the ground otherwise required that more than two strands be used 
to fill in gaps in the fence line. (Id. at pp. 12-13, 78 and 80-
81) . 
6. Hardman's horses have never escaped from his pastures as 
a result of stepping over, jumping over, or pushing through his 
barbed wire fence. (Id. at 112; Hardman Depo., pp. 10, 69-85, 
Exhibit "E"). In the 15 years that Hardman has kept horses, there 
have only been two occasions where his horses have escaped from the 
winter pasture. (Hardman Transcript, pp. 11-13 and 24-25, Exhibit 
"K"; Hardman Depo. pp. 10, 69-85, Exhibit "E"). The first occasion 
was in 1987 or 1988 when the river that adjoins the winter pasture 
was being dredged allowing the water to drop and the horses to 
escape through the river bed. (Hardman Depo., pp. 10, 69-85, 
Exhibit "E") . The other occasion was in the fall of 1989, 
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approximately two weeks before the accident, when a section of 
fence along the winter pasture was torn down by poachers. (Hardman 
Transcript, pp. 11-13 and 24-25, Exhibit "K"). On both of these 
occasions, the horses that escaped the pasture were found in the 
field directly north of the winter pasture; the horses did not find 
their way onto State Road 68. (Id. at 11-13, 24-25; Hardman Depo., 
pp. 10, 69-85, Exhibit "E"). 
7. Before the accident of this case, Hardman repaired the 
section of fence on the north side of the winter pasture two to 
three times in the fall season of 1989 because of trespassers and 
vandals knocking the fence down. (Hardman Transcript, pp. 10, 11, 
Exhibit "K"). Horses were not in the winter pasture the first time 
the fence in that area was observed down. (Id. at 14) . As 
previously stated, the horses walked out of the winter pasture on 
only one of the two or three occasions when the fence was 
vandalized. (Id. at pp. 11-13 and 24-25). 
8. During the time that his horses are in the winter pasture, 
Hardman and his wife, Lora, check the horses to determine their 
location at least twice a day from their home using binoculars. 
(Hardman Depo, pp. 95-96 Exhibit "E"; Deposition of Lora Hardman, 
pp. 38-39, Exhibit "0"; R. 735-739.) Hardman also physically went 
out and inspected the fences surrounding the winter pasture 
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everyday in the two weeks before the accident. (Hardman Transcript, 
p. 150, Exhibit "G")• 
9. In a further effort to discourage trespassing, Hardman and 
his wife report incidents of trespassing to the County Sheriff. 
(Hardman Depo., pp. 119-120, 224, Exhibit "E"). "No trespassing" 
signs are posted on the fence to the winter pasture, and "no 
hunting" signs are posted prior to hunting season. (Hardman 
Transcript, pp. 22, 130, 148, Exhibit "G") . The gates of the 
winter pasture are kept closed and locked, and trespassers are 
asked to leave the premises whenever they are found on Hardman's 
property. (R. 700-701.) 
10. The only access to the property next to the winter 
pasture is through a guard gate at Camp Williams. (Hardman 
Transcript, pp. 129-30, Exhibit "G"). Camp Williams posts a guard 
at the gate 24 hours a day and will allow the public to enter Camp 
Williams' property to go fishing on the Jordan River if they 
register with the guard. (Id.). On several occasions before the 
accident, Hardman and his wife contacted personnel from Camp 
Williams to make them aware of trespassing and to request that they 
take measures to discourage trespassing. (Jd. at 19; Hardman 
Depo., p. 22-26, Exhibit "E"). Camp Williams has orders to stop 
anyone attempting to enter its property through the guard gate and 
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to notify persons of the boundaries of Camp Williams property and 
that they are not to enter private property. (Id.)* 
11. The other three roads that lead to the winter pasture are 
closed to traffic with gates that are kept locked. (Hardman 
Transcript, pp. 21 and 128-30, Exhibit "G"; Exhibit "P") . A deep 
cement ditch runs through the hayfield to the west of the winter 
pasture which prevents vehicles from driving through the hayfield 
to the winter pasture. (Id.) 
12. At approximately 4:30 p.m. on the day of the accident, 
within three hours of when the accident occurred, Hardman visually 
inspected the section of fence that had been let down on the north 
side of the winter pasture and observed that the fence was in good 
repair and adequate to hold the horses in the pasture. (Hardman 
Transcript, pp. 150, 155, Exhibit "G"; Hardman Transcript, Rebuttal 
Testimony, pp. 2-4, 6; Exhibit MR") . Hardman also saw at that time 
that his horses were in the pasture. (R. 736). 
13. Hardman learned of the accident when he arrived home on 
the evening of November 2 0 and saw police cars and ambulances on 
S.R. 68 near his home. (Hardman Depo., p. 57, Exhibit "E"). When 
Hardman learned that his horse had been involved in the accident, 
he communicated to the investigating police officer that hunters or 
poachers had probably let his fence down which allowed his horses 
to escape from the winter pasture. (Hardman Transcript, p. 4, 
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Exhibit "K"). Hardman's comment to the investigating officer was 
based on his prior experience with trespassers vandalizing his 
fences and his knowledge that his horses were securely fenced in 
the pasture and could not escape unless vandals tore down the 
fence. (Id. at 4-5) . 
14. On the morning following the accident of this case, at 
approximately 7:00 a.m., Hardman went down to the winter pasture to 
determine where his horse escaped from the pasture. (Hardman 
Transcript, p. 9, Exhibit lfG"; Hardman Deposition, pp. 94-95, 
Exhibit "E"). Hardman observed that a section of the fence on the 
north side of the pasture had been let down. (Hardman Transcript, 
pp. 15-16, Exhibit "G"). Upon closer inspection, Hardman observed 
that the strands of barbed wire on the north fence line had been 
unwound from three of the fence posts near the northwest corner of 
the winter pasture and were lying on the ground on the inside of 
the pasture. (Id. at 15-16 and 151-52; Hardman Deposition, pp. 
108-09 and 112-114, Exhibit "E"). The wires of the fence were not 
broken or cut. (Hardman Depo., p. 106, Exhibit "E"). Hardman also 
observed deer entrails (the "guts" of a deer) that had recently 
been killed and several magpie birds feeding on the entrails in the 
area very near where the fence had been let down. (Id.; R. 736). 
Hardman further observed tire tracks located between two of the 
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fence posts on the north side of the pasture where the fence had 
been let down. (Hardman Transcript, pp. 91-93, Exhibit "G"). 
15. Based on his observations, Hardman determined that the 
fence had been let down by unidentified trespassers, possibly deer 
poachers, since there was a recent deer kill and tire tracks. (R. 
736.) The fact that the fence had been unwound, not cut or broken, 
and was lying on the inside of the pasture was another clear 
indication to Hardman that unidentified trespassers let down his 
fence and allowed the horses to escape. (Hardman Depo. , pp. 106-
114, Exhibit "E"). 
16. After Hardman saw that the fence had been let down, he 
immediately reported the incident to the Utah County Sheriff's 
office. (R. 311-312; Hardman Depo., pp. 111-12, Exhibit "E") . 
Jerry Monson is the Deputy from the County Sheriff's office who 
responded to Hardman's call. (Monson Transcript, p. 5, Exhibit 
"L"). Monson prepared a detailed report for the Sheriff's office 
of the incident. (R. 311-312.) Monson noted in his report that 
Hardman had reported "hunters knocking down his fence, causing his 
horses to get out on the highway." (Id.) Monson further reported 
that he "responded to scene with the RP [Reporting Party/Hardman] 
and observed where the fence was down." (Id.) The report also 
stated that "[i]t appeared someone had knocked the fence down with 
a full size pick-up, as there was old tire tracks near the fence." 
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(Id.)- Monson testified that he observed a pile of deer entrails 
in the vicinity of where the fence was down. (Id.; Monson 
Transcript, p. 12, Exhibit "L"). The fact that the entrails were 
on the ground for Monson to observe, and had not been eaten by 
other animals, indicated to Monson that the deer had recently been 
poached. (Id. at 11-12). 
17. Under the section of his report regarding action taken, 
Monson wrote, "RP [Reporting Party/Hardman] wanted to show R/D 
[Reporting Deputy] the fence because he is afraid of being suied 
[sic] for having his horse cause an accident." (R. 311-312.) 
Monson testified at trial about how Hardman told him the morning 
after the accident that the cause of the accident was not Hardman's 
fault. (Monson Transcript, p. 18, Exhibit "L"). 
18. In addition to reporting the incident to the Utah County 
Sheriff's office, Hardman also reported the incident to Robert 
Harmon, an insurance adjuster from Utah Farm Bureau Insurance 
Company, on the morning following the accident. (Hardman Depo., p. 
112, Exhibit "E") . On that same morning, Robert Harmon drove to 
the winter pasture in the area where the fence had been let down. 
(Harmon Depo., p. 6, Exhibit "Q"). Harmon testified in his 
deposition that he observed in the pasture next to the fence that 
had been let down deer entrails from a recent deer kill. (Id. at 
7, 10-12). He also testified to observing barbed wire from the 
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fence near the northwest corner of the pasture lying on the ground 
toward the inside of the pasture. (Id. at 7, 8, 33). Harmon took 
photographs which showed that section of the fence that had been 
let down, the location of the wires and posts, and the condition of 
the fence. (Id. at 13, 20-35). He testified that the remainder of 
the fence line was secure other than the area he photographed. 
(Id. at 37). 
19. The automobile in which Askew was riding as a passenger 
was being driven by Kevin Butts. (Butts' Deposition, pp. 12 and 
13, Exhibit "S" (Kevin Butts' deposition was read to the jury at 
trial.)) Kevin Butts passed a 55 m.p.h. speed sign and a sign 
warning of deer "next two miles" on S.R.68 about one mile prior to 
impact. (Id. at 10) . Kevin Butts estimated that he was travelling 
65 m.p.h. at the time of the collision. (Id. at 20). Jim Brierly 
was the investigating officer for the Utah Highway Patrol who was 
asked to calculate the speed of Butts' vehicle at the time of the 
collision. (Brierly Depo., p. 7, Exhibit "T"). Brierly conducted 
a highway drag analysis based on Butts' skid marks and determined 
Butts' speed at the time of the collision at 72 m.p.h. (Id. at 
19). 
20. Kevin Butts, who was travelling south on S.R. 68, further 
testified that he did not see the horse prior to impact, even 
though the horse was hit in its left rear in the center of the 
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southbound lane as it was traveling south along State Road 68. 
(Butts' Depo., pp. 20, 23, Exhibit "S"; Guest Depo., pp. 20-27, 
Exhibit lfUlf) . Amanda Hardman, Hardmanfs 20 year old daughter, 
testified as follows regarding Kevin Butts representations to her 
after the accident: "he had been driving down the road, and he 
looked up and saw horses or horses's hooves, I donft remember 
which, and then he collided with a horse." (Amanda Hardman Depo., 
p. 7, Exhibit "V"). Kevin Butts told his father on the night of 
the accident that he had been looking at Askew trying to calm her 
down as they were riding in his Camaro. (Larry Butts Depo., p. 18, 
Exhibit "W"). Askew was upset due to an argument she had with her 
mother before leaving her house with Kevin Butts. (Kevin Butts 
Depo., pp. 13, 19, Exhibit "S"). 
21. Askew settled her claims against Kevin Butts prior to 
trial. (R. 1646). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I.A. The proper standard of review is that "in matters of 
discovery a trial court has broad discretion which will not be 
disturbed absent a showing of abuse." Brown v. Superior Court In 
and For Maricopa Cy.. 670 P.2d 725, 729 (Ariz. 1983). 
I.B. The trial court properly ruled that the documents in the 
claim file were prepared in anticipation of litigation. The cases 
cited by Askew support a per se rule that a document cannot be 
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prepared in anticipation of litigation unless an attorney is 
involved. Thomas Organ v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 
367 (N.D.I11. 1972). However, the holding and apparent reasoning of 
Thomas Organ has been considered and rejected by the Utah Supreme 
Court, Gold Standard v. American Barrack Resources, Inc., 805 P.2d 
164, 169 (Utah 1990). 
The trial court properly applied the multi-factored approach 
mandated by the Utah Supreme Court in Gold Standard in ruling that 
Utah Farm Bureau's claim file was prepared in anticipation of 
litigation and was, therefore, protected. R. 290-291. 
In the instant case, Utah Farm Bureau's insured, Hardman, 
anticipated litigation as evidenced by his call to the Utah County 
Sheriff's Office and his insurance agent on the morning following 
the accident. He reported a potential claim to his insurance 
company and wanted the Sheriff to observe the scene immediately so 
the Sheriff could later testify, if necessary, that trespassers 
knocked his fences down. 
Utah Farm Bureau's claims agent, Greg Johnson, testified by 
affidavit that it was his experience that an accident between a 
vehicle and livestock typically results in litigation. (Affidavit 
of Greg Johnson, f 3, attached as Exhibit "C") . The nature of this 
claim required that Utah Farm Bureau anticipate litigation from the 
date of the accident. 
14 
With respect to the statement of Hardman (Entries 3-4 of 
Exhibit "A"), the trial court properly considered that there must 
be heightened protection for statements taken by representative of 
an insurance company from its insureds. See Heidebrink v. Moriwaki, 
706 P.2d 212, 216 (Wash. 1985). 
The trial court also considered the fact that Utah Farm 
Bureau's attorney, Stephen G. Morgan, instructed Greg Johnson to 
take the statement from Hardman and create other documents to 
assist Mr. Morgan in defending this action. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in protecting 
Utah Farm Bureau's statement from discovery. The court considered 
all the relevant facts, including: 1) the nature of the insurance 
industry; 2) the attorney involvement of Mr. Morgan; 3) the fact 
that the documents sought (the entire claim file) were not relevant 
to the litigation; 4) the fact that the insured, Hardman, 
anticipated litigation and immediately called his insurance agent 
to report the potential claim and called the Sheriff to preserve 
the evidence to prove that trespassers knocked his fence down; 5) 
the size and nature of Askew1s claim suggested litigation was 
imminent; and 6) the testimony of Mr. Greg Johnson, who indicated 
that he anticipated litigation from the date of the accident. R. 
110-113. 
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I.e. Askew has not demonstrated substantial need for the 
statement of Paul Hardman or the claim file. Paul Hardman testified 
at length about the condition of the fence the morning after the 
accident. R. 1804. (Deposition of Paul Hardman, pp. 108-110 
attached as Exhibit "E"). Askew also introduced the report of 
Officer Jerry Monson of the Utah County Sheriff's Office prepared 
the morning after the accident at the request of Hardman. R. 311 
(Attached as Exhibit "F"). Finally, Mr. Robert Harmon photographed 
the fence at approximately the same time he took the statement of 
Hardman the morning after the accident. These documents constitute 
the "substantial equivalent" of materials sought by Askew. 
I.D. Askew also argues that Hardman waived the work product 
privilege by testifying about matters discussed in the statement 
during his deposition. Askew has provided absolutely no support 
for the proposition that one waives the work product privilege 
merely by discussing the matters contained in the protected 
documents during a deposition. The gist of Askew's argument is that 
the work product privilege is waived when one testifies about the 
same facts in a deposition as are in the protected statement. 
However, the principles of "subject matter waiver" are inapplicable 
to the work product privilege. 
I.E. Assuming that the trial court erred in ruling that the 
claim file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and, 
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therefore, protected, any such error was harmless. Most of the 
documents in the claim file dealt with insurance company procedures 
or the establishment of reserves and were irrelevant to the legal 
issues in the matter. Moreover, many of the documents contained the 
mental impressions of the adjuster for Utah Farm Bureau and were 
therefore, absolutely protected. Askew was not harmed by her 
inability to obtain the statement of Hardman because the jury was 
well apprised of the condition of the fence by the testimony of 
Hardman, the report of Officer Monson, and the photographs of the 
fence the morning after the accident. 
II. Askew properly concludes that she must establish that the 
trial court abused its discretion in excluding Robert Harmon as a 
witness. Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P. 2d 204, 205-07 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). The trial court 
properly balanced the concern that insurance would be injected into 
the trial if Mr. Harmon was called as a witness against Askewfs 
ostensible reason for calling Mr. Harmon. 
III. Askew is proper in her assertion that she must establish 
that the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting her from 
informing the jury that she did not take the photographs. A review 
of the trial court's ruling demonstrates that the trial court 
properly denied Askew1s request. On the last day that evidence was 
taken (during Askew1s rebuttal), Askew requested that she be 
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allowed to testify that neither she nor her representative took the 
photographs. Instead, she wanted to create the impression that the 
photographs were taken by a representative of Hardman. Askew's 
obvious purpose was to inject insurance into the litigation. Judge 
Davis properly refused to allow Askew to do so. 
ARGUMENT 
From the outset of this litigation, Askew has made a concerted 
and overt attempt to inject into this litigation the fact that 
Hardman was insured by Utah Farm Bureau. First, when discovery was 
initially commenced, Askew attempted to discover Utah Farm Bureau's 
entire claim file and the statement of Hardman (November 25, 1993). 
The trial court (Judge George Ballif (Retired)) ruled against 
Askew. Askew then filed a motion to reconsider the ruling, which 
was denied by Judge Ballif. Askew then filed an interlocutory 
appeal which was denied by the Utah Supreme Court. Then, near the 
close of discovery and shortly before trial, Askew sought to depose 
Robert Harmon, the adjuster for Utah Farm Bureau that took the 
statement of Hardman (November 16, 1992). Askew also asked the 
Court for a second time to allow discovery of the claim file, this 
time claiming "substantial need." The trial court (Judge Lynn 
Davis) allowed the deposition. Askew then sought to call Harmon as 
a witness at trial. This request was denied by the trial court on 
January 4, 1993. Finally, on the last day evidence was presented at 
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trial, during rebuttal testimony, Askew asked permission from the 
Court to inform the jury that a representative of Hardman had taken 
the photographs Askew entered into evidence. 
The fact that the jury found Hardman not guilty of negligence 
is conclusive evidence that Hardman was free from fault. Askew's 
proof on the issues of negligent conduct and causation was so weak 
that her only prospect for recovery from Hardman was to inject 
insurance into the litigation and hope the jury would sympathize 
with her and award a substantial amount of money. Hardman 
respectfully asserts that the trial court properly guarded against 
Askew's relentless attempts to inject insurance into the litigation 
and upheld the law of this state which mandates "that the question 
of insurance is immaterial and should not be injected into the 
trial; and that it is the duty of both counsel and the court to 
guard against it [footnote omitted].11 Robinson v. Hreinson, 409 
P.2d 121, 123 (Utah 1965). 
I 
THE DOCUMENTS CONTAINED IN THE INSURER'S CLAIM FILE WERE 
PREPARED IN ANTICIPATION OF LITIGATION AND WERE THEREFORE 
PROTECTED AS WORK-PRODUCT. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The proper standard of review is that "in matters of discovery 
a trial court has broad discretion which will not be disturbed 
absent a showing of abuse." Brown v. Superior Court In and For 
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Maricopa Cy.. 670 P.2d 725, 729 (Ariz. 1983)(case involved insurer 
claim file); see also Wakabayashi v. Hertz Corp. , 660 P.2d 1309 
(Hawaii 1983) . "A ruling will be reversed only when the trial court 
reached a conclusion against the logic and natural inferences to be 
drawn from the facts and circumstances before the court." Burr v. 
United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 560 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Ind. App. 
1990)(case involved insurer claim file). 
B. THE DOCUMENTS WERE PREPARED IN THE ANTICIPATION OF LITIGATION 
Perhaps it is best to first state what is not the law before 
addressing the law of Utah. Askew cites several cases in support of 
a per se rule that a document cannot be prepared in anticipation of 
litigation unless an attorney is involved. Ballard v. Eighth 
Judicial Dist. Ct.. 787 P.2d 406 (Nev. 1990); Hall v. Goodwin, 775 
P.2d 291 (Okla. 1989); Henry Enter, v. Smith, 592 P.2d 915 (Kan. 
1979). Each of these cases stems from Thomas Organ v. Jadranska 
Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367 (N.D.I11. 1972), which Askew hails 
as the "leading case with respect to discovery of an insurer's 
claim file." (Brief of Appellant, P.26 n.12). Askew goes so far as 
to call the rule espoused in Thomas Organ the "majority rule." 
Other courts have found differently. For example, the District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania has found that "[t]he 
Thomas Organ view has been rejected by many courts as contrary to 
the intent of the 1970 Amendments" to the Federal Rules of Civil 
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Procedure. Basinaer v. Glacier Carriers. Inc., 107 F.R.D. 771 
(M.D.Pa. 1985). 
Moreover, the holding and apparent reasoning of Thomas Organ 
have been considered and rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. Gold 
Standard v. American Barrack Resources, Inc., 805 P.2d 164f 169 
(Utah 1990). The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Other courts have rejected the strict approach of Thomas 
Organ and have used attorney involvement as only one 
factor in a more fact-specific determination of whether 
material was prepared in anticipation of litigation. ... 
The rule that better effectuates the language of Rule 
26(b)(3), and its underlying rationale, is that attorney 
involvement is only one factor to be weighed in 
determining the applicability of the work product 
privilege. See Moore v. Tri-City Hosp. Auth., 118 F.R.D. 
646 (N.D.Ga. 1988); 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 
Practice & Procedure, § 2024, at 207 (1970). Moreover, 
the leading treatises have rejected the Thomas Organ 
approach. 4 J. Moore, J. Lucas, & G. Grotheer, Moore's 
Federal Practice, f 26.64[2], at 26-360 n.23 (2d ed. 
1989); 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 2024, at 205-06 (1970). 
Id. at 169 (emphasis added). Thus, the cases relied upon by Askew 
have been rejected in Utah and the trial court properly refused to 
be bound by a rule which the Utah Supreme Court refused to accept. 
The trial court properly applied the multi-factored approach 
mandated by the Utah Supreme Court in Gold Standard in ruling that 
Utah Farm Bureau's claim file was protected. R. 290-291 (The 
Court's ruling is attached as Exhibit "B"). First, the trial court 
considered the fact that these documents were prepared by an 
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insurance company in connection with Askew's potential claim.1 The 
Court found persuasive the following language from the Eastern 
District of Missouri: 
[T]he anticipation of the filing of a claim is undeniable 
once an accident has occurred and a person injured or 
property damaged. This is especially true in today's 
litigious society. Documents prepared at that time, 
therefore, are clearly prepared "in anticipation of 
litigation" and "by or for another . . . party's 
representative." 
Fontaine v. Sunflower Beef Carrier, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 89, 92 
(E.D.Mo.1980). Another statement of this principle was made by the 
Iowa Supreme Court, which stated: 
In our litigious society, when an insured reports to his 
insurer that he has been in an incident involving another 
person, the insurer can reasonably anticipate that some 
action will be taken by the other party. The seeds of 
prospective litigation have been sown, and the prudent 
party, anticipating this fact, will begin to prepare his 
case. Although a claim may be settled short of the 
institution of legal action, there is an ever-present 
possibility of a claim's ending in litigation. The 
recognition of this possibility provides, in any given 
case, the impetus for the insurer to garner information 
regarding the circumstances of a claim. 
Ashmead v. Harris, 336 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 1983). Another 
landmark case in this area is Almaguer v. Chicago. Rock Island & 
Pacific R.R., 55 F.R.D. 147 (D.Neb.1972). In Almaguer, the District 
Court for the District of Nebraska held: 
1
 Gold Standard did not involve an insurer's claim file, and, 
therefore, the Utah Supreme Court did not consider whether an 
insurer prepares its claim file in anticipation of litigation. 
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The anticipation of the filing of a claim against a 
railroad, when a railroad employee has been injured or 
claims to have been injured on the job, is undeniable, 
and the expectation of litigation in such circumstances 
is a reasonable assumption. 
Almaauer. 55 F.R.D. at 149; see also Firemen's Fund Insurance v. 
McAlpine. 391 A.2d 84 (R.I. 1978). The Supreme Court of Alabama has 
stated that fI[s]tate courts have generally taken the position of 
Almaauer." Ex Parte State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 386 So.2d 
1133, 1136 (Ala. 1980). 
In the instant case, Utah Farm Bureau's insured, Hardman, 
anticipated litigation as evidenced by his call to the Utah County 
Sheriff's Office and his insurance agent on the morning following 
the accident. He wanted the Sheriff to observe the scene 
immediately so the Sheriff could later testify, if necessary, that 
trespassers knocked his fences down. That litigation was 
anticipated is further evidenced by his statement to the Sheriff: 
Action Taken: RP [Reporting Party/Hardman] wanted to show 
R/D [Reporting Deputy] the fence because he is afraid of 
being suied [sic] for having his horse cause an accident. 
R. 311. (Utah County Offense Report, Exhibit "F"). Moreover, at 
trial, Officer Monson testified: 
Q. (BY MR. MORGAN) Do you recall him telling you that, 
"It's not my fault?" 
A. Yes. 
(Monson Transcript, p. 18, Exhibit "L"). 
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Not only did Hardman anticipate litigation, but his insurer, 
Utah Farm Bureau, also anticipated litigation as soon as Hardman 
reported the potential claim on the morning following the accident. 
At the time, Askew was in a coma and her family was concerned for 
her survival. Hardman's insurance policy would have covered only a 
fraction of the anticipated medical expenses even if Hardman was 
found negligent. The initial investigation demonstrated that in 
Utah Farm Bureau's judgment, there was no liability on the part of 
Hardman because the actions of trespassers caused the horse to 
escape. Under these circumstances, Utah Farm Bureau would have been 
negligent in carrying out its duty to its insured if it failed to 
anticipate litigation. 
These very factors led the Alabama Supreme Court to protect 
statements taken in anticipation of litigation. Ex Parte State Farm 
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 386 So.2d 1133 (Ala.1980). There, a State Farm 
insured permitted another to use his vehicle. The permissive driver 
killed the plaintiff's decedent. As part of its investigation, 
State Farm's claim representative took seven statements from 
witnesses to the accident. The plaintiff sought to discover these 
statements. In denying plaintiff's request, the Supreme Court of 
Alabama perceptively noted: 
In this case, State Farm's claims specialist testified, 
by affidavit, that from the very outset of his 
investigation, it was obvious to him that State Farm's 
insured was free from liability, and that he prepared all 
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of the documents for eventual litigation. Even though 
State Farm did not turn over its file to its attorney 
until after the lawsuit was filed in September, we opine, 
from the meager evidence in the record, that the 
investigation was conducted in anticipation of 
litigation. From the nature of the case, a death claim. 
State Farm's agent could have reasonably concluded that 
its insured would be sued. This was not the type of 
fender-bender where a settlement with the insured would 
likely occur without a lawsuit. 
Id. at 1136 (emphasis added) . Utah Farm Bureau was in a similar 
position. This Court should hold that an adjuster is warranted in 
investigating a claim in anticipation of litigation when every 
single fact and all of the adjuster's experience tells him that 
litigation should not only be anticipated, but is certain to occur. 
Here, Utah Farm Bureau's claims agent, Greg Johnson, testified 
by affidavit that it was his experience that an accident between a 
vehicle and livestock typically results in litigation which must be 
prepared for: 
3. As Claims Manager, I have established a procedure for 
handling claims involving livestock on the highway. It 
has been my experience that once a claim is reported that 
involves livestock on the highway which is allegedly 
owned by a Utah Farm Bureau insured, I anticipate from 
that time forward that a claim may be filed in connection 
with the accident by the insured, or the driver or 
occupants of the vehicle that came in contact with the 
livestock. 
R. 112 (Affidavit of Greg Johnson, f 3, attached as Exhibit "C"). 
This is in accordance with rule 26, which protects documents 
prepared "by or for that other party's representatives (including 
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his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent)." 
Utah R.Civ.P. 26. 
With respect to the statement of Hardman (Entries 3-4 of 
Exhibit "A"), the trial court properly considered that there must 
be heightened protection for statements taken by an insurance 
company from its insured. The Supreme Court of Washington expressed 
the delicate public policy concerns which mandate heightened 
protection of statements between insureds and insurers as follows: 
An insured is contractually obligated to cooperate with 
the insurance company. Such an obligation creates a 
reasonable expectation that the contents of statements 
made by the insured will not be revealed to the opposing 
party. The insurer, on the other hand, has a contractual 
obligation to act as the insured's agent and secure an 
attorney. The insured cannot choose the attorney but can 
expect the agent to transmit the statement to the 
attorney so selected. Without an expectation of 
confidentiality, an insured may be hesitant to disclose 
everything known. Such non-disclosure could hinder 
representation by its selected attorney. 
Heidebrink v. Moriwaki, 706 P.2d 212, 216 (Wash. 1985). 
The trial court also considered the fact that Utah Farm 
Bureau's attorney, Stephen G. Morgan, instructed Greg Johnson to 
take the statement from Hardman and create other documents to 
assist Mr. Morgan in preparing to defend this action. In September, 
1986, Mr. Morgan sent Utah Farm Bureau a letter instructing him to 
have the insured prepare certain documents and that Utah Farm 
Bureau should take any statements which it deemed necessary to 
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prepare Mr. Morgan for litigation. R. 115-119 (attached as Exhibit 
"D") . 
Askew claims that these letters should not be used to protect 
documents prepared three years later. Askew misses the point of 
these letters and their import in this matter. The documents which 
Mr. Morgan instructed Utah Farm Bureau to create are not created in 
the ordinary course of business. Instead, they are created to 
assist Mr. Morgan in his defense of the claim should the matter 
proceed to trial. The claim's adjuster is certainly able to 
resolve a simple claim without the use of these documents. However, 
when the matter proceeds to litigation, the attorney needs these 
documents in order to defend the claim. 
Askew's proposed rule mandating attorney involvement ignores 
the realities of the insurance industry. From the date of the 
accident, the relationship between the claimant and the alleged 
tort-feasor's insurer is adversarial. The claimant will try to 
maximize his or her recovery. The insurer will try to limit its 
exposure. At any time, the claimant can sue the tort-feasor or the 
insurance company can force the claimant to sue by refusing to pay. 
Indeed, a liability insurance company is generally under no duty to 
settle or pay a claim until the tort-feasor is found negligent and 
a judgment entered against the insured. 
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion in protecting 
Utah Farm Bureau's statement from discovery. The court considered 
all the relevant facts, including: 1) the nature of the insurance 
industry; 2) the attorney involvement of Mr. Morgan; 3) the fact 
that the documents sought (the entire claim file) were not relevant 
to the litigation; 4) the fact that the insured, Hardman, 
anticipated litigation; 5) the size and nature of Askew's claim 
suggested litigation was imminent; and 6) the testimony of Mr. Greg 
Johnson, who indicated that he anticipated litigation from the date 
of the accident. 
Recall that the original protective order was entered by Judge 
George Ballif (retired) . At the close of discovery, Askew made a 
second motion to compel seeking the tape recording of the statement 
and claiming "substantial need." Judge Davis ruled: 
Plaintiff's motion to compel, I believe frankly, that 
there is some expectation of confidentiality. I believe 
there's a public policy argument that's a persuasive one. 
I also believe that while it may not have been 
anticipated by Judge Ballif of a broad protective order 
that would go to the issue of the tape or transcript of 
the tape, it certainly appears that since that time there 
has been no additional —well, I'll state it as an 
inadequate showing of substantial need. 
There is a work product involved that ought to be 
protected. Courts are granted broad discretion on these 
issues, weighing the facts involved and sort of the civil 
counterpart of a totality of the circumstances involved, 
and granted broad discretion under Rule 26(b)3 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to weigh those facts and 
make a determination. 
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(Transcript of December 28, 1992, hearing, p. 3, attached as 
Exhibit "H"). Two trial judges, each applying their discretion and 
considerable experience gained from the bench, have considered 
Askew's request for the claim file and both have rejected the same. 
Askew may not agree with the trial court's conclusion, but the 
ruling was not "against the logic and natural inference to be drawn 
from the facts and circumstances before the court." Burr v. United 
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 560 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (111.App. 1990) . 
The trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
C. ASKEW DID NOT HAVE A "SUBSTANTIAL NEED" FOR THE STATEMENT OP 
HARDMAN. 
Askew claims that even if the statement of Hardman was 
prepared in anticipation of litigation, she was entitled to 
discover the statement because she had demonstrated "substantial 
need." The burden rests with Askew to show substantial need and 
undue hardship. Toledo Edison Co. v. G.A. Technologies, Inc., 847 
F.2d 335, 340 (6th Cir. 1988) (cited with approval in Gold Standard 
v. American Resources, 805 P.2d 164 (Utah 1991)). 
The essence of Askew's argument is that only three witnesses 
observed the pasture and the fence the morning after the accident— 
Robert Harmon, Officer Jerry Monson, and Hardman. It is claimed by 
Askew in order to advance her argument that neither of the latter 
two witnesses had a good recollection of the condition of the fence 
the morning after the accident, and that Mr. Harmon was precluded 
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from testifying by the trial court. Askew thus claims a substantial 
need for the "contemporaneous" statement of Hardman. However, as 
demonstrated in this brief, Askew was provided with a multitude of 
evidence which conclusively established the condition of the fence 
and surrounding area the morning after the accident. 
First, Mr. Hardman testified at length and in great detail 
regarding the condition of the fence the morning after the 
accident. As an example, Mr. Hardman testified as follows in his 
deposition: 
Q. And you recall — where I believe you testified that the 
wire had been taken off the corner? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was the same as a couple of weeks earlier the 
wire had been taken off the corner post? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many wires had been taken off the corner post? 
A. Two. 
Q. Is that the number of wires that ran along the north 
fence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you put the fence up on the morning of the 21st of 
November, tell me how you did that? 
A. I just pulled it to the corner post and wired it on. 
Q. With your hands? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you wire — 
A. As I remember, I did. 
Q. Do you recall whether wired — well, first, let me ask 
this. How much of the fence had been taken down? 
A. Probably three poles, two or — from the corner, probably 
three steel posts. It was all drooping. But I mean, you 
know, laying on the ground, as I recall, there were maybe 
three poles. 
Q. Three posts along there? 
A. Yes. Three posts. 
Q. So the wire had been pulled off three posts? 
A. Yeah. 
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Q. Would that be including the corner post or the corner 
post and — 
A. No. That doesn't include the corner post. 
Q. — three more. Were the posts bent? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you observe whether the wire that had wired the 
barbed wire to the post had been cut? 
A. No I didn't. 
Q. Did you observe whether it had been undone? 
A. No. Didn't find that wire. 
Q. Did you look for it? 
A. No. Well, when I pulled that back, I looked for the wire 
to wire it back to the post, but I didn't — 
Q. You didn't see the wire lying there on the ground or 
anything? 
A. Did not see the wire lying on the ground, no. 
R. 1804 (Hardman Depo., pp. 108-110, Exhibit "E"). Hardman had a 
very good recollection of the condition of the fence and the 
surrounding area the morning after the accident. 
The second witness, Officer Jerry Monson, concededly could not 
recall the exact condition of the fence during his deposition. 
However, Officer Monson's detailed report completed the morning 
after the accident was produced to Askew. In his report, Officer 
Monson stated: 
R/D responded to scene with the RP and observed where the 
fence was down. It appeared someone had knocked the 
fence down with a full sized pickup truck, as there was 
old tire tracks near the fence. Also, R/D observed where 
a deer had recently been poached on the RP's property. 
R. 311 (Utah County's Sheriff's Report, Exhibit "F"). Thus, while 
Mr. Monson may not have been able to recall the exact condition of 
the fence during his deposition, Askew has already been provided 
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with the prized "contemporaneous" statement of Mr. Monson in the 
form of his report. 
Finally, Mr. Robert Harmon photographed the fence at 
approximately the same time as he took the statement of Hardman— 
the morning after the accident. Hardman testified at trial that the 
photographs fairly depict the condition of the fence as observed 
the morning after the accident. (Transcript of Hardman, pp. 68, 
Exhibit "G"). Hardman testified similarly with respect to other 
pictures taken the morning after the accident. The notes of the 
investigating officer, David Guest, dated December 7, 1989, which 
was 17 days after the accident, reflect the following concerning 
the photographs: 
Called Paul Hardman—He said he hadn't heard anything yet 
and he said that the day after he went to the field where 
the horses were and the fence was down and he went home 
and called the sheriff's office. A Deputy came and found 
a fresh deer kill and took pictures of vehicle tracks 
crossing the fence. 
R. 1818. These photographs qualify as the "substantial equivalent" 
of what Askew hoped to obtain from the statement of Hardman. The 
photographs show the exact condition of the fence the morning after 
the accident. 
Judge Davis considered all of these elements in ruling that 
Askew had failed to demonstrate "substantial need": 
There must be a showing of substantial need and the 
plaintiff is unable to obtain a substantial equivalent of 
the evidence contained within that particular recording. 
32 
This court is aware of the standard announced both 
in Mower and also the Gold Standard cases, and believes 
that there is a substantial equivalent. One, in the 
written record of deputy Jerry Monson, albeit somewhat 
abbreviated, and while he has no independent recollection 
of this date of some of the facts involved, there is a 
written record. 
Secondarily, there has been a long deposition of the 
defendant involved that's been demonstrated somewhat in 
excess of 200 pages. The inquiry regarding quote un, 
quote, "contemporary statements" made the following 
morning to a representative of the insurance adjuster are 
fairly detailed in the estimation of this court. 
Despite that ruling, defendants have supplied 
plaintiffs with seven photographs that were taken on that 
particular morning. 
(Transcript of December 28, 1992, hearing, pp. 37-38, attached as 
Exhibit "H"). Under Rule 26(b)(3), Askew is not entitled to exact 
information. Rather, Askew is entitled to the "substantial 
equivalent" of the materials she seeks. Gold Standard v. American 
Barrack Resources, Inc., 801 P.2d 909, 910 (Utah 1990). This is 
what she was provided. 
Finally, Askew argues that she is entitled to the statement of 
Hardman because courts have "recognized that contemporaneous 
statements . . . constitute 'unique catalysts in the search for 
truth1 and have accordingly ordered production of such statements." 
(Brief of Appellant, p. 36). Askew relies upon Professor Moore's 
treatise and the treatise of Professors Wright and Miller to 
support this proposition. However, Professors Wright and Miller 
have also stated that "it will be true that discovery of work 
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product material will be denied if the party seeking discovery can 
obtain the information he desires by taking the depositions of 
witnesses.11 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, at § 2025 (1970). Likewise, in 
Hamilton v. Canal Bridge Co. , 395 F.Supp. 975, 978 (E.D.La. 1974), 
a case relied upon by Askew, the Court held: 
If a witness were available, the court might then require 
counsel to depose him and demonstrate to the Court with 
some specificity just why they expect his statement to 
supply information his deposition did not. 
Id. Askew1s own authorities suggest that while statements 
contemporaneous with the accident are important, production should 
not be required if the party is able to be deposed. 
Essentially, Askew argues that statements should always be 
produced because of the close proximity between the accident and 
the statement. The trouble with this argument is that it would 
render Rule 26(b)(3) meaningless. A party would always be entitled 
to such materials even though they are protected as work product 
because the statement by its very "contemporaneous" nature will be 
taken prior to the deposition. As the Washington Supreme Court 
held: 
Although the statement was taken two days after the 
accident, the passage of time alone is insufficient to 
allow discovery. Respondents have failed to show any 
other extenuating circumstances justifying disclosure. 
Hence, the passage of time in the instant case fails to 
carry the day. Rather the more important fact is that 
the statement in question is that of the Defendant. He 
is not unavailable; in fact it was in his deposition that 
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the conflict arose. There is no claim that he has no 
present recollection of the events in question. 
Heidebrink v. Moriwaki. 706 P.2d 212f 218-19 (Wash. 1985). It has 
also been stated: 
The unique value of contemporaneous statements has 
repeatedly been recognized. . . . Such statements have 
been referred to as "unique catalysts in the search for 
truth." . . . It is equally settled, however, that mere 
speculation or hope that the requested statement may 
prove to be contradictory or impeaching is not sufficient 
to overcome the limited privilege applicable to trial 
preparation materials. Stephens Produce Co. . Inc. v. 
N.L.R.B. . 515 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1975); Hauaer v. 
Chicago. Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 216 F.2d 501, 508 
(7th Cir. 1954). 
In balancing these conflicting considerations, this 
Court concludes that it is necessary for plaintiff to 
show more than the mere contemporaneousness of the 
requested statements. 
Fontaine v. Sunflower Beef Carrier. Inc., 87 F.R.D. 89, 93 
(E.D.Mo.1980). 
Moreover, in making the substantial need determination, 
"attention is directed at alternative means of acquiring the 
information that are less intrusive to the lawyer's work and 
whether or not the information might have been furnished in other 
ways." Toledo Edison Co. v. G.A. Technologies. Inc.. 847 F.2d 335, 
340 (6th Cir. 1988). Allowing Askew to depose Hardman, obtain the 
photographs taken of the fence, and receive Officer Monson's report 
were certainly less intrusive than requiring production of the 
statement and allowed Askew to obtain the information she sought. 
Askew was provided with the "substantial equivalent" of the 
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materials she seeks. Thus, Askew did not have a "substantial need" 
for Hardman's statement. 
D. HARDMAN DID NOT WAIVE THE ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE. 
Askew also argues that Hardman waived the work product 
privilege by testifying about matters discussed in the statement 
during his deposition. Askew has provided absolutely no support 
for the proposition that one waives the work product privilege 
merely by discussing the matters contained in the protected 
documents during a deposition. 
The gist of Askew1 s argument is that the work product 
privilege is waived when one testifies about the same facts in a 
deposition as in the protected statement. In other words, the 
principle of "subject matter" waiver applies equally to both the 
attorney-client privilege and the work-product privilege. This is 
contrary to established legal principles which hold: 
Work product doctrine is a source of immunity separate 
and distinct from the attorney-client privilege, so that 
a waiver of the latter privilege does not necessarily 
mean that the protection afforded by the work product 
doctrine is also breached. 
10 Fed. Proc, Discovery and Depositions, § 26:113 (1988). 
Additionally, it has been held that: "A waiver of the attorney-
client privilege does not affect the protection against the 
disclosure of the "work product" of an attorney." Annotation, 
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Development Since Hickman v. Taylor of Attorneys "Work Product" 
Doctrine, 35 A.L.R.3d 412, 485 (1971). 
More specifically, Askew1s notion of "subject matter waiver" 
is inapplicable to the work product privilege. The general rule is 
that "the broad concepts of subject matter waiver analogous to 
those applicable to claims of attorney-client privilege are 
inappropriate when applied to work product materials." 10 Fed. 
Proc, Discovery and Depositions, § 26:114 (1988). 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has likewise held: 
Thus, to the extent that a concept of subject matter 
waiver is applicable to Rule 26(b)(3) . . . it does not 
extend to a case such as this where there has only been 
inadvertent or partial disclosure in response to specific 
inquiries, and in which no testimonial use has been made 
of the work product. 
Duplan Corp. v. Peering Millikan. Inc., 540 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 
1976). Thus, there is no support for Askew1s contention that the 
work product privilege may be waived in the same manner that the 
attorney-client privilege is waived. 
Rule 26(b)(3) would be rendered meaningless if Askew's 
proposed rule were accepted. If Hardman refused to testify about 
the factual matters he also testified to in the statement, Askew 
would have the "substantial need" she seeks and would claim an 
entitlement to the statement. But when Hardman testified about the 
matters in his deposition, Askew claimed waiver and an entitlement 
to the statement. Askew claims "substantial need" if Hardman is not 
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deposed, and waiver if he is. In order to give Rule 26(b)(3) full 
effect, a party must be permitted to protect a statement taken in 
anticipation of litigation and fully testify about his factual 
knowledge.2 
Askew's position is not supported by any case law or other 
authority. Before Askew's argument is accepted as law, Askew 
should, at the very least, be required to show that her argument is 
"warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. . .." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 11. The rules of procedure governing this state require 
no less. 
E. THE FAILURE OP THE COURT TO ORDER PRODUCTION OP THE CLAIM PILE 
WAS HARMLESS ERROR. 
Assuming that the trial court erred in ruling that the claim 
file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and, therefore, 
protected, any such error was harmless. Rule 61 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure mandates that this Court ignore any error which 
"does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Utah 
2
 Moreover, Askew's argument creates a tremendous weapon for 
the party seeking to prevent discovery. The attorney for that party 
could take statements from all material witnesses and then prevent 
those witnesses from giving their depositions or testifying about 
the same "subject matter" at trial in order to prevent waiver. 
Clearly, the goal of full factual discovery would be destroyed 
under Askew1s proposed rule. To further all goals, the party must 
be allowed to protect the document but fully testify as to his or 
her factual knowledge. 
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R.Civ.P. 61. Interpreting this rule, the Utah Supreme Court has 
placed "upon an appellant the burden of showing not only that an 
error occurred, but that it was substantial and prejudicial in that 
the appellant was deprived in some manner of a full and fair 
consideration of the disputed issues by the jury." Ashton v. 
Ashton. 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987). 
The most important principle in this regard is that this Court 
should "exercise every reasonable presumption in favor of the 
validity of a general verdict." Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. 
Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982). The Utah Supreme Court has 
also stated that "an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a 
different outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine our 
confidence in the verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 
789 (Utah 1991). 
Preventing Askew from discovering the insurer's claim file did 
not undermine confidence in the verdict and did not affect Askew1s 
substantive rights. Attached as Exhibit "A" is a detailed summary 
of the documents contained in the insurer's claim file. R. 121-122. 
This document was also presented to the trial court in connection 
with Hardman's motion for a protective order. Obviously, any 
documents created after the January 17, 1991, letter from Mark 
James, Askew's attorney, to Robert Harmon (Entry 23) are protected 
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under the anticipation of litigation doctrine. Thus, at issue are 
entries 1-22. 
The vast majority of the documents are status reports and 
inter-office correspondence. (Entries 5, 7, 13, (11 & 15)3 16-22). 
These documents contain the mental impressions, conclusions, and 
opinions of Utah Farm Bureau's claim's adjuster, Greg Johnson, and 
pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are 
absolutely protected. Mower v. McCarthy, 245 P.2d 224 (Utah 1952). 
See R. Ill (Affidavit of Greg Johnson, 5 6, attached as Exhibit 
"C") . 
The second class of documents were as easily obtainable by 
Askew as Utah Farm Bureau. They include: 
6. Investigating Officer's report. 
9. Copy of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-38. 
10. Copy of Utah Farm and Ranch Law—Animals on Highway. 
12. Handwritten note on Horse with Certificate of 
Registration on Horse. 
These documents could have been obtained by Askew at any law 
library or, in the case of the Investigating Officer's report, by 
contacting the appropriate governmental agency. As such, Askew 
cannot complain that she did not have the opportunity to discover 
these documents. 
3
 The reserve is the estimated amount needed by the insurer to 
resolve a contingent liability. The establishment of reserves 
necessarily involves an opinion and mental impression regarding the 
value of the case and the potential of prevailing at trial. 
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The final class of documents deal with insurance company 
computer documents and contain no facts relevant to this lawsuit: 
1. Computer print-out on policy information 
2. Report of Claim 
8. Copy of Check 
14. Copy of Check 
It is doubtful that any of these documents would have been 
relevant to the issue of Hardman's negligence and most would not 
have been admitted at trial for the same reason. These documents 
also would not have been admitted because to do so would inject 
insurance into the litigation, thereby prejudicing Hardman. 
Askew has the burden of demonstrating to this Court that but 
for the trial court's alleged error, she would have prevailed at 
trial. She has not even attempted to meet this burden in her Brief 
of Appellant. 
The only other document in the claim file was the tape of the 
recorded statement (and subsequent transcription of the statement) 
which the insurance agent, Robert Harmon, obtained from the 
insured, Hardman, on the morning following the accident. Any error 
relating to the production of the tape and statement of Hardman was 
likewise harmless. Askew sought the tape and statement of Hardman 
for the purpose of injecting insurance into the trial and to show 
the jury the condition of the fence and surrounding pasture the 
morning after the accident. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 32-33). But 
the jury was already given an exact picture of the condition of the 
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fence the morning after the accident through the photographs taken 
the morning after the accident and Officer Jerry Monson's report, 
also completed the morning after the accident, both of which were 
entered into evidence. The report stated: 
R/D [reporting deputy] responded to scene with the RP 
[reporting party] and observed where the fence was down. 
It appeared someone had knocked the fence down with a 
full sized pickup truck, as there was old tire tracks 
near the fence. Also, R/D observed where a deer had 
recently been poached on the RP's property. 
R. 311 (Utah County Offense Report, Exhibit lfF") . The photographs 
taken by Mr. Robert Harmon the morning after the accident showed 
the exact condition of the fence. Additionally, Hardman was cross-
examined by Askew and he gave a detailed description of the 
condition of the fence the morning after the accident. 
There was also testimony at trial as to the condition of the 
fence before the accident. Paul Hardman testified that he checked 
the fence on the very evening the accident occurred: 
Q. Were the posts and wire in place on November 20, 1989, 
at 4:30 p.m. when you last saw it prior to the accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
(Hardman Transcript, p. 4, Exhibit "R"). In addition, Doug Smith 
testified that he repaired the fence about four weeks before the 
accident: 
Q. Were you asked to do some repairs to Paul Hardman's 
fence in 1989? 
A. Yes, sir, I was. 
Q. How long before that accident would it have been that 
you would have made the repairs to Mr. Hardman's fence? 
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A. Well, I don't know exactly. I don't remember the date 
exactly, but it was in latter part of October or early 
November. 
Q. Did you do whatever you felt you needed to do to make 
it an adequate fence to contain horses? 
A. I did. 
Q. And in your opinion it was? 
A. Yes, sir, it was. It was adequate before I repaired 
it. I don't think they could have ever got out. 
* * * 
Q. When you finished doing your work, what do you recall 
in terms of the height of the lower wire and the height 
of the upper wire along the north side of the pasture? 
A. I would say that somewhere the lower wire is 18 inches 
to two feet, somewhere in that vicinity. The upper wire 
would have been three and a half to four feet. 
Q. Do you know what kind of fence you need build in order 
to keep trespassers out? 
A. There is no kind of fence you can build to keep 
trespassers out. 
Q. Is a two strand barbed wire fence standard or normal 
in Utah County to contain horses? 
A. Yes, it is. There's a lot of one wire also. 
(Smith Transcript, pp. 7-8, 16-17, Exhibit "J"). 
The jury was well apprised of the condition of the fence the 
morning after the accident. Askew's counsel showed the jury time 
and again the condition of the fence the morning after the accident 
as depicted in the photographs. Her counsel questioned Hardman at 
length regarding the condition of the fence. Now Askew claims that 
she was denied a fair trial because she was not allowed to show the 
jury the condition of the fence for the "umpteenth" time. Simply 
put, a party is not denied a fair trial because she was only 
allowed to present the same evidence four times but not five. 
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Hardman respectfully asserts that the failure to admit the 
statement should not "undermine [this Court's] confidence in the 
verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P. 2d 789, 796 (Utah 
1991). Thus, the verdict should be upheld. 
F. CONCLUSION 
In the Brief of Appellant, Askew understates her burden, which 
is two-fold. First, she must establish that the trial court abused 
its discretion in ruling that the claim file was prepared in 
anticipation of litigation. This requires a showing that the trial 
court's holding was "against the logic and natural inferences to be 
drawn from the facts and circumstances before the court." Burr v. 
United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 560 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Ind. App. 
1990) . Assuming she can carry this burden, she must still 
demonstrate that "the likelihood of a different outcome is 
sufficiently high as to undermine our confidence in the verdict." 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
Askew has not even attempted to show that the trial court 
abused its discretion by applying the Gold Standard principles to 
the claim file, nor has she demonstrated that she would have 
prevailed at trial if she would have discovered the claim file. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED ROBERT HARMON AS A 
WITNESS IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE INJECTION OF INSURANCE 
INTO THE ACTION 
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A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
Askew properly concludes that she must establish that the 
trial court abused its discretion in excluding Robert Harmon as a 
witness. Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204, 205-07 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) , cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988) . However, she has not 
presented any facts which suggest that the trial court abused its 
discretion. The trial court properly excluded Mr. Harmon as a 
witness in order to avoid the danger of injecting insurance into 
the trial. The general rule that insurance covering the defendant 
should not be injected into the trial is so well accepted that it 
has been adopted as Rule 411 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Reeves 
v. Gentile. 813 P.2d 111, 121 (Utah 1991); Tias v. Proctor. 591 
P.2d 438, 440 (Utah 1979). 
The trial court properly balanced the concern that insurance 
would be injected into the trial if Mr. Harmon was called as a 
witness against Askew1s ostensible reason for calling Mr. Harmon. 
Judge Davis stated as follows in ruling on the matter: 
THE COURT: Well, then you're essentially opening up the 
flood gates so that you can subpoena any insurance agent 
or insurance adjustor or investigator for an insurance 
company and— 
I believe a line of cases still support the fact 
that ultimately it can be prejudicial or may be, 
particularly in a case where we're not talking about an 
auto accident where there's some reasonable reflection 
upon insurance but liability insurance that attaches to 
a farmer with some property in a fairly remote area and 
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a variety of things that way. I think the reasoning may 
be more persuasive if we had two automobiles. 
(Transcript of January 4, 1993, pp. 12-13, attached as Exhibit 
"H"). Judge Davis went on to state: 
THE COURT: I'll grant your Motion to Quash. It's left 
with the sound discretion of the Court. 
I believe that there's—the probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the possibility of prejudice 
or interjection of issues of insurance into the case, 
which ultimately can either elevate awards or at least 
may have that possibility. 
It also appears to the Court that the testimony 
would be cumulative. Still have an officer or a trooper 
that was there—no. Let's see. Excuse me. It's a Deputy 
County Sheriff that was present on that morning, who made 
a report, plus a defendant himself who was present on 
that occasion. So I'll grant your Motion to Quash. 
(Transcript of January 4, 1993, p. 14, Exhibit "M"). 
The trial court found that the danger of injecting insurance 
into the litigation was to be avoided at all costs. Askew's 
ostensible reason for calling Mr. Harmon was to confirm the 
condition of the fence the morning after the accident, a condition 
conclusively established by the testimony of Hardman, Officer 
Monson, and by the photographs taken by Mr. Harmon the morning 
after the accident. 
Askew claims in her brief that Harmon's testimony concerning 
the condition of the fence was needed because it was inconsistent 
with the testimony of Hardman and, therefore, diminished the 
credibility of Hardman. (Brief of Appellant, note 25) . However, 
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Askew did not demonstrate any difference in her brief between the 
testimony of Hardman and Harmon regarding the condition of the 
fence the morning after the accident. Indeed, the only alleged 
difference cited in Askew's brief dealt with the location of the 
deer "entrails," not the condition of the fence. Id. (Harmon 
testified in his deposition that the entrails were "inside" the 
pasture, which is essentially the same testimony given by Officer 
Monson who testified that the entrails were in the vicinity of 
where the fence was down; Hardman, on the other hand, testified 
that the entrails were a quarter mile from where the fence was 
down). 
Since Mr. Harmon's testimony was cumulative and unnecessary, 
there was no need to risk the injection of insurance into the 
litigation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
preventing Askew from calling Mr. Harmon as a witness. 
B. EVEN IF IMPROPER, THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING WAS HARMLESS. 
Moreover, even if erroneous, the failure to allow Askew to 
call Mr. Harmon as a witness was harmless error. The jury was well 
apprised of the condition of the fence the morning after the 
accident. Because the jury would have had the same impression of 
the fence even if Mr. Harmon testified, any error in excluding him 
as a witness was harmless. Askew has not shown that "the likelihood 
of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine our 
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confidence in the verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 
789 (Utah 1991). The verdict should be affirmed. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING 
TO ALLOW ASKEW TO TESTIFY (1) THAT NEITHER SHE NOR HER 
REPRESENTATIVE TOOK THE PHOTOGRAPHS OR (2) ABOUT THE 
ORIGIN OR THE PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY ROBERT HARMON. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY. 
Askew is proper in her assertion that she must establish that 
the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting her from 
informing the jury that she did not take the photographs. But she 
does not attempt to meet this burden. Instead, she states in 
conclusory fashion that the ruling "was erroneous and prejudicial 
to Askew's case." For obvious reasons, such unsubstantiated 
statements should not form the basis for a reversal. 
A review of the trial court's ruling demonstrates that the 
trial court properly denied Askew's request. On the last day that 
evidence was taken (during Askew1s rebuttal), Askew requested that 
she be allowed to testify that neither she nor her representative 
took the photographs. Instead, she wanted to create the impression 
that the photographs were taken by a representative of Hardman. 
Askew1s obvious purpose was to inject insurance into the 
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litigation.4 Judge Davis properly refused to allow Askew to do so. 
The Court ruled as follows: 
THE COURT: I thought I ruled on that. I said that it 
would be too prejudicial, and the issue of insurance—I 
don't want to risk a mistrial in this case seven days 
into the trial. 
(Transcript of January 13, 1993, attached as Exhibit "I"). 
The identity of the individual taking the photographs was not 
relevant. What was material was that the photographs fairly 
depicted the condition of the fence on the morning after the 
accident. (Transcript of Hardman, pp. 68, attached as Exhibit "G") . 
As with other aspects of this litigation, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion when it weighed the danger that insurance 
would be injected into the trial against Askew1s minimal need to 
inform the jury that a representative of Hardman took the 
photographs. Judge Davis1 consideration of this issue evidences a 
sincere effort to weigh the potential prejudice to Hardman if 
4
 Askew's desperate attempt to inject insurance into the 
litigation was apparent during rebuttal. Askew spent six days 
presenting her case to the jury. Hardman spent only a day and a 
half presenting his defense. Askew then sought to call some ten 
witnesses in rebuttal, including a second livestock expert which 
was never revealed to Hardman prior to trial. Askew realized 
before rebuttal that her case regarding liability was weak. To 
compensate for this weakness, Askew employed every conceivable 
device in an attempt to inform the jury of insurance. If, as Askew 
contends, the trial court took extreme steps to prevent the 
injection of insurance, it was only because such extreme steps were 
necessary to counter Askew's relentless attempts to inject 
insurance into the trial. 
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insurance was injected into the litigation against Askew's 
purported need for the testimony. 
B. ANY ERROR IN EXCLUDING THIS TESTIMONY WAS HARMLESS. 
Again, Askew has the burden of showing that "the likelihood of 
a different outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine our 
confidence in the verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch,, 817 P.2d 
789 (Utah 1991). Any error in this regard was harmless because the 
issue was not the identity of the photographer, but whether or not 
the photographs accurately depicted the condition of the fence. 
This was conclusively established at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, Hardman respectfully requests 
that all rulings of the trial court and the jury verdict be 
affirmed. 
DATED this /£ day of September, 1993. 
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50 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /b day of September, 1993, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
to be hand-delivered to the following: 
Gary A. Dodge 
Mark F. James 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State Street, #1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
51 
